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CRIMINAL LAIV CU.)UiENTS
flaue, ed before him, and many of the cases turn on that very point.3 5
Th . Tennessee view. in addition to its care lest the private citizen
be unreasonably disturbed, is apparently that a court would be ratify-
ing the acts of the officer if it appropriated his evidence wrongfully
obtained. anl that if officials can violate the law and be forgiven, dis-
respect for law by individuals would result.36 The attitude of such
rourts as those of New York is that a criminal should not go free because
of a technical blunder on the part of an officer.37 And in light of the
attitude of the United States Supreme Court that when a state does
admit evidence obtained by unreasonable search it has not denied the
;wcused a fair trial nor sacrificed a fundamental principle of justice,38
it would seem that such practical considerations of law enforcement
as the New York court has articulated should govern, particularly in a
society confronted with organized crime.
JOHN S. WHITTLESEY.
A Recent Extension by the United States Supreme Court of the
Doctrine of Incidental Search
The recent case of Harris v. United States' appears to have revived
the controversy concerning the scope of protection afforded to indi-
viduals by the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.2 As
proof that the decision aroused interest in other than legal circles,
nearly every newspaper had some editorial comment to make on the
holding, all forboding sinister consequences to follow. In both the lay
journals and dissenting opinions it was plain that the writers believed
that the conduct of the police officers here approved by the majority of
the Court harked far back to the days of writs of assistance in the
American Colonies and of general warrants in England. 3 Whatever
the dangers, real or imaginary, lurking behind the new holding, it is
certain that the case has added another chapter to the confusing body
of law known as "searches and seizures."
35 This was argued by the prosecution in Cox v. State, cited supra note 6, but
was rejected by the court. That case is difficult to distinguish on this point from
Smith v. State, cited suepra note 14, where the evidence was held admissible. The
element of subterfuge appears to be the paramount element to the Tennessee court
in the principal case. Contra: People v. Exum, cited supra note 17, where articles
in plain view on an automobile seat were held admissible, the court saying, "A
search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed, and it is not
a search to observe that which is open to view.'
36 See Hampton v. State, 148 Tenn. 155, 252 S.W. 1007 (1923).
37 People v. DeFore, cited supra note 29.
38 Palko v. Connecticut, cited supra note 25.
1 .... U.S ..... , 67 S. Ct. 1098 (1947).
2 U.S. Const. Amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.''
3 For reports of Otis' famous argument, see Quincy 471, et seq. (Mass. 1761).
See also, Paxton's Case, Id. at pp. 51-57. For the case abrogating the general war-
rant in England, see Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029. Although
the objects of both types of warrants were different, they both allowed a general
search for any incriminating matter that might be turned up. They were issued
on the basis of suspicion only.
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The facts were undisputed.4 Two valid warrants of arrest were
issued for the petitioner Harris. The warrants charged violation of
the Mail Fraud Statute and the Natibnal Stolen Property Act.5 It was
alleged, on probable cause, that a forged check had been sent through
the mails in connection with a scheme to defraud a certain company in
the sum of $25,000. Five agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion went to Harris' apartment, found him there alone and arrested
him. Without the authority conferred by a search warrant, the officers
began a very thorough five hour search of all the rooms of the apart-
ment, for what the testifying agents described as "anything they could
find in connection with the violation of the law with which petitioner
was charged." 6 As the search neared its end, one of the agents uncov-
ered a sealed envelope in a bedroom bureau drawer marked personal
papers. In it were found some draft cards, the possession and altera-
tion of which constituted a violation of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940.7 These were seized, and subsequently used as the
basis of a prosecution of Harris for violation of the draft law. There
was a conviction in the District Court and the defendant was sentenced
to five years imprisonment. No evidence whatever was uncovered that
tended to connect Harris with the offense for which he was originally
arrested. Prior to trial the petitioner made proper motion to suppress
the evidence thus seized, which was denied. The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the search was carried
on in good faith by the federal agents for the purposes expressed; that
it was not a general exploratory search for merely evidentiary mate-
rials; and that the search was reasonably incident to Harris' arrest.8
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the conviction was
affirmed. The sole question presented was whether the trial court had
erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. This question
involved a consideration of whether the search and seizure was such
as is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, i.e., whether it was, in the
language of the Constitution, "unreasonable." If it was, then the
judgments below would have to be reversed and the petitioner set free,
for it has long been the rule that a conviction in the federal courts
based upon evidence so obtained cannot be sustained.9 In a five to
four decision the Court held that the search had not violated the peti-
tioner's Constitutional rights, and hence, affirmed the conviction.
4 This is significant because usually there is an issue of whether the accused
consented to the search or not. The protection of the Fourth Amendment may be
waived. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 528 (1945).
5 35 Stat. 1130, 1131 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. §338 (1925). And, 53 Stat. 1178,
1179 (1913), 18 U.S.C.A. §413 et seq. (1926).
6 The trial court found that they were looking for stolen property-two stolen
checks; one of the dissents points out that, inter alia, they seized personal letters,
note books, bills, etc. There was no motion to return these objects.
754 Stat. 885, 894, 895, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §311 (1940).
S 151 F. (2d) 837 (C.C.A. 10th, 1947) Note (1947) 30 Minn. L. Rev. 207.
9 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925). This is because of a supposed "interplay" between the Fourth and
the immunity against self-incrimination given in the Fifth. The doctrine has its
historic origin in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) which held that private
papers could not be subpoenaed without violating both the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. One writer has pointed out that the rule is not restricted to the area covered
by the Fifth Amendment, but extends to corporations as well and disallows the use
of derivative evidence from the fruits of a trespass. See Grant, Constitutional Basis
of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence in a National Prose-
cution (1944), 15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 60. And compare, Corwin, The Fifth Amendment
(1930), 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1.
1947]
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
In order to uphold the conviction the majority resorted to this rea-
soning. The entry into Harris' apartment was lawful and so was the
arrest. It is a well-settled police practice that arresting officers may
search the person of the accused and seize anything in his control.' 0
As the "fruits and instruments" of the crime with which Harris was
charged were stolen checks and other rather small items it was per-
fectly appropriate for the agents to institute a meticulous hunt through
all four rooms. The trial court had determined that the agents had
conducted the search in good faith for the objects specified and had
not embarked upon a general exploratory search. Because the draft
cards were contraband, i.e., things illegally possessed, they were prop-
erly subject to seizure as distinguished from merely evidentiary papers
which cannot be seized even with the aid of a search warrant.-' To the
objection that the objects seized had nothing to do with the crime
charged, the Court answered that the illegal possession of the- cards
constituted a "continuing offense," the existence of which enhanced
the powers of the officers to step in and stop its operation. In other
words, the presence of the well-secreted draft cards was equivalent to
the active perpetuation of a crime which could be stopped at any time
under any conditions' 2
The dissents were extremely vigorous. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
carefully tabulated the tremendous number of cases decided under the
Fourth Amendment to demonstrate that never had the Court sanc-
tioned an incidental search so broad and intensive. In an earlier case
he had already exhaustively reviewed the history of Congressional
treatment of the subject to show how "warily Congress has walked
precisely because of the Fourth Amendment.' 13 While all the dis-
senters felt that the search was lawless, Justices Frankfurter, Rutledge,
and Murphy based their objections on the duration and intensity of
the search, 14 and the fact that the officers had been able to exercise
greater powers under cover of an arrest warrant than would have been
permissible had they obtained a search warrant beforehand with its
requirement that the place to be searched and the things to be seized
be particularly described therein.15 The most effective attack upon
the majority's position, however, was carried by Mr. Justice Jackson.
10 For historical background, see opinion of Cardozo, J. in People v, Chiagles,
237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 313 (1927):
cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11 Search warrants were not generally available to federal law enforcement
officers until the First World War. 40 Stat. 217, 228 (1917), 18 U.S.C.A. §612 (1925).
The property sought must fall into one of the three categories: a) Stolen or em-
bezzled; b) used as a means of committing a felony; c) used to aid illegally a
foreign nation. Purely evidentiary matter may not be sought. Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921). Manifestly draft cards fall within the second category.
12 Accord Paper v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 184, (C.C.A. 4th, 1931); United
States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, Inc. 10 F. (2d) 736 (0.C.A. 2d, 1926).
13 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 528 (1945).
14 As per Mr. Justice Murphy: "Thus when a search of this nature degenerates
into a general exploratory crusade, probing for anything and everything that might
evidence the commission of a crime, the Constitution steps into the picture to pro-
tect the individual. If it becomes evident that nothing can be found without a
metioulous uprooting of a man's home, it is time for the law enforcement officers
to secure a warrant."
15 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. There is also no right of seizure incident to the
execution of a search warrant. Only the exact objects specified therein may be taken.
"As to what is to be seized, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant of search." Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 132 (1927).
[Vol. 38246
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He cogently reasoned that the fair mneaniing of the Constitutioial pro-
vision with respect to searches is that the determination of the place to
be searched and the objects to be seized is to be left always to a "dis-
interested magistrate" and never in effect to be delegated to the eager
searchers themselves. The once severely confined exception as to
the seizure of things on the person of the accused at the time of his
arrest should not be used to subvert the plain meaning of the Amend-
ment. If the arresting officer was permitted at his own discretion to
pick the place in which to arrest the accused. and was restricted in the
subsequent search only by his own zeal, then clearly the Constitutional
safeguards were now all for naught.'
6
When viewed against the formidible body of doctrine built up
around the Fourth Amendment since 1914 the instant case takes on
an added significance. In that year the case of Week-s v. United States
was decided and the so-called Federal rule of excluding unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence was' set upon its devious course. 17 By allow-
ing the victim of an illegal search to suppress before trial the use of
evidence so obtained, a remedy which no state court had theretofore
allowed and only a minority today observe,'" the Court hoped to put
teeth into the historic mandate of the Fourth Amendment. "If the
constable blundered the criminal was to go free." By thus liberally
construing the Constitution in favor of the individual the Court built
up a tight body of rules to be followed by Federal agents' 9 with regard
to searches, which rules were transgressed at the peril of having the
Government's case upset by any Federal court when properly appealed.
Up until the Second World War the right of officers to search the
home or office of the accused contemporaneously with his arrest had
been severely confined. Only contraband, such as liquor or narcotics,
in plain view in the room in which the arrest took place was allowed
to be incidentally seized.20 Any prolonged rummaging through the
papers and effects of the accused without a previously acquired search
16 As John Adams said of the writs of assistance: "They put the privacy of
the individual at the mercy of any petty officer." 2 C. F. Adams, Works of John
Adams, pp. 523-525 (1850-1856).
17 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See note 9 supra. This case is said to have overruled
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) sub silendo, where it was held that the
trial court will not stop during the progress of the trial to try a "collateral" issue,
i.e. the lawfulness of the means used to obtain the matter offered in evidence. The
Court in the Weeks case said the demand for return of the unlawfully seized matter
had to be made before trial, but later, in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921), it was held that the motion could be made during trial if the defendant
had not known of the seizure prior to trial.
18 For a complete listing of state court holdings both pro and con the rule in
the Weeks case, see Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) Vol. 7 §2183, p. 11, note 2.
Within the decade following the W~eeks ca.e, of the forty-six state courts that passed
on the question, thirty-two courts expressly rejected the rule and only fourteen
adopted it. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
19 Evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons and state officers and turned
over to the Federal authorities is admissible. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921). But if the Federal Government participates, either by requesting active
state co-operation, Gambino v. United States. 275 U.S. 310 (1927), or by joining
through its officers in the search, Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 310 (1927), the
evidence is inadmissible unless it is secured according to the standards set by the
Federal Court.
20 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192 (1927). In the latter case the sale of liquor was actually being transacted
when the agents entered, which accounts for the fact that the Court allowed the
ledgers and bills there seized, in plain sight, to be used.
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warrant was soundly condemned. 2 1 Nothing discovered during the
progrcss of an unauthorized search could by some notion of inverted
1rclspass ab initio save the object seized from judicial anathematiza-
t ion.21
ITie furthest the Court had gone in extending the area of search
in,.idlet to arrest prior to the Harris case was in the case of Davis v.
VUtited States decided by a divided court in 1945.23 There the defend-
ant was ari-rested at his place of business, a gas station, and illegally
possessed gas coupons were taken from his office without a warrant.
'he Court upheld the search, saying it was reasonably incident to the
arrest for violation of the rationing laws, and that the nature of the
objects seized (government documents) removed the bar of the Fifth
Amendment against self-incrimination.2 4 The right of privacy, which
is said to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, 25 was not invaded
because the search was made of a "public place of business during
business hours." While the Davis case is no authority for the holding
in the present case it at least indicates the new trend which the Harris
case continues.
The difficulty of decision in any particular case is of course increased
by the retention of the exclusionary rule. The Court would be much
more ready to label certain police -practices unconstitutional if the
result were not to set the obviously guilty free. Many learned com-
mentators have urged that the Court rectify its "historical blunder"
and reinstate the common-law rule of "no-questions-asked," leaving
the victim to his action in trespass.26 Others say that without the rule
the Amendment would become a mere form of words.27 The Court
may desire to keep the rule as an effective weapon against a future
piece of police legislation which would trench too freely on individual
21 Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930); United States v. Left-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). Per Judge L. Hand in Kirschenblatt v. United States,
16 F. (2d) 202, (C.C.A. 2d, 1926): "After arresting a man in his house, to rummage
at will among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to
be indistinguishable from what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the
warrant would give more protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magis-
trate. True, by hypothesis, the power would not exist if the supposed offender were
not found on the premises, but it is small comfort to know that one's papers are
safe only so long as one is not at home.''
22 Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1920); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925).
23328 U.S. 528 (1945). Note (1947) 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 413.
24 The Coupons were similar to account books which must be kept for the Govern-
ment under the provisions of some statute. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911).
2.5 'They (the forefathers) conferred as against the government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right every unjustifiable intrusion by government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment." Brandeis, J. in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928) (dissenting).
26 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) Vol. 7 §2183, 2184; Harno, Evidence Ob-
tained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1925), 19 Ill. L. Rev. 303; Fraenkel, Con-
cerning Searches and Seizures (1921), 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361; Wingren, A Short
Review of the Law on Searches and Seizures (1946), 18 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 345.
27 Cornelius, Search and Seizure (1926), p. 54; Chafee, The Progress of the
Law (1922), 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 694; Atkinson, Unreasonable Searches and Seiz-
ures (1925), 25 Col. L. Rev. 11; Comment (1945) 30 Iowa L. Rev. 456; Comment
(1944) 17 St. John's L. Rev. 103.
An action based on the violation of the Constitution itself in the federal courts
may be possible. See Bell v. Hood, .... U.S. , 66 S. Ct. 773 (1946). Note (1946)
41 Ill. L. Rev. 558.
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